INTRODUCTION Some years ago, a group from several intelligence agencies was discussing the question of indications analysis and strategic warning. Reminded by an individual present that analysts who used indications methodology had correctly forecast both the North Korean attack on South Korea in 1950 and the Chinese intervention, a relative newcomer to the intelligence business said, “Yes, but you couldn't have done a very good job, because no one believed you.’’ This bit of unintentional humor aptly describes much of the problem of warning intelligence. Why is it that “no one’’—a slight but not great exaggeration—believes in the indications method, despite its demonstrably good record in these and other crises which have threatened our security interests? Can the reluctance to believe be in part from the lack of understanding of the nature of indications analysis or the lack of experience with “real’’ warning problems? This work was originally written in the early 1970s as a classified textbook for intelligence analysts and their supervisors and for use in intelligence courses. It was the product of some twenty-five years experience with indications and warning intelligence from the analytic standpoint. So far as I know, it was the first and perhaps still the only effort by an intelligence analyst to bring together a body of experience on the warning problem and to set forth some guidelines to assist analysts and others involved in the warning process. The examples used in the text were drawn largely from World War II and the Cold War. Within little more than the past decade, major and dramatic developments have significantly altered the nature of the warning problem. The first was the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, the areas that had been the primary focus of collection and indications analysis for over forty years. The second was the emergence of terrorism—dramatically brought home on 11 September 2001—as a major, if not the major threat to our security. Obviously, these great developments have significantly altered the targets of collection and focus of analysis in the Intelligence Community. Table of Contents Foreword - Editor’s Preface - Introduction - Chapter 1. The Role of Warning Intelligence - General Nature of the Problem - What Is Warning? Intentions versus Capabilities Chapter 2. Introduction to the Analytical Method Indicator Lists: Compiling Indications Fundamentals of Indications Analysis Specifics of the Analytical Method Chapter 3. Military Indications and Warning The Nature of Military Indicators Order-of-Battle Analysis in Crisis Situations Logistics is the Queen of Battles Other Factors in Combat Preparations Chapter 4. Political Factors for Warning Ambiguity of Political Indicators A Problem of Perception Considerations in Political Warning Chapter 5. Warning from the Totality of Evidence The Relative Weight of Political and Military Factors Isolating the Critical Facts and Indications Some Guidelines for Assessing the Meaning of Evidence Reconstructing the Adversary's Decisionmaking Process Chapter 6. Surprise and Timing Principal Factors in Timing and Surprise Examples of Assessing Timing Warning is Not a Forecast of Imminence Chapter 7. The Problem of Deception Infrequency and Neglect of Deception Principles, Techniques and Effectiveness of Deception Types of Deception What Can We Do About It? Chapter 8. Judgments and Policy Facts Don't “Speak For Themselves’’ What Do Top Consumers Need, and Want, to Know? Intelligence in Support of Policy? Assessing Probabilities